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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In South America, Chile has had the longest tradition
of democratically elected governments. The longest
interruption of democracy in Chile's history was the
military regime of General Augusto Pinochet. The thesis is
an analysis of current civil-military relations in Chile.
It examines eleven prerogatives of the military, as an
institution in a democratic regime, and as defined by Alfred
Stepan.
From September 1973 until March 1990, the military in
Chile, under General Augusto Pinochet, held the reins of
power. Since March of 1990, Chile has been under civilian
rule: Patricio Aylwin, 1990-1994; Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle,
1994-present . Although both Aylwin and Frei were elected
directly by the voters, some scholars argue that Chile has
not consolidated its democracy, due in large measure to the
continuing influence and prerogatives of the Chilean
military.
The first part of the thesis reviews the events leading
to the overthrow of the socialist President Salvador
Allende. The main factor in the demise of the socialist
government was its inability to effectively deal with
coalition politics and rampant inflation. This section also
deals with the coup led by General Pinochet and the reforms
IX
of his seventeen-year authoritarian government. The
transition to democracy is examined from the plebiscite in
1988 to the Frei Ruiz Tagle government and the detention of
General Pinochet in London for human rights violations in
November 1998.
The thesis is a single case study of Chile, viewed
longitudinally from 1988 to 1998. The body of the thesis
reviews the military prerogatives in Chile during the
Pinochet regime as compared to the military prerogatives of
today. Numerous pieces of legislation were enacted during
the Pinochet regime to ensure the strong position of the
military in dealing with the successor elected civilian
governments. The democratically elected governments of
Aylwin and Frei have attempted to reduce the prerogatives of
the military through legislation, but with limited success.
Finally, this thesis looks at the prospects for
consolidation of democracy in Chile. It reviews the legacy
of the military regime and the politics of coalition
building in the Chilean party system. A key element to
removing the vestiges of the military prerogatives in the
elected government is to build a coalition to garner the
votes necessary for constitutional change.
The issue of civil-military relations in Chile is
important because Chile has the most promising economy in
Latin America and the fostering of democracy provides
stability and security to support United States goals in the
region. The thesis is also important because countries in
the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay) and outside of the region have moved from military
authoritarian rule to democracy. In each of those
countries, the civilian control of the military is an issue
that needs to be addressed in order to fully consolidate
democracy. The Chilean case may have implications for these
other cases.
The character of Chilean military prerogatives has
changed from 1988 to 1998. The military no longer has as
many high prerogatives as it had during the authoritarian
regime of Pinochet. However, the Chilean military still
retains many prerogatives that do not allow the civilian
government full control of the military.
The thesis concludes that if the military prerogatives
in Chile continue, democracy will not be fully consolidated.
However, Chile has made significant strides since 1988 in
achieving civilian authority over the military. As a





It was obvious that Chile was headed for
self-destruction, so the armed forces took
over to defend our country's integrity.
General Pinochet, 11 March 1998 1
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
In South America, Chile has had the longest tradition
of democratically elected governments. The longest
interruption of democracy in Chile's history was the
military regime of General Augusto Pinochet. The thesis is
an analysis of current civil-military relations in Chile.
It examines eleven prerogatives of the military, as an
institution in a democratic regime, and as defined by Alfred
Stepan.
From September 1973 until March 1990, the military in
Chile, under General Augusto Pinochet, held the reins of
power. Since March of 1990, Chile has been under civilian
rule: Patricio Aylwin, 1990-1994; and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-
Tagle, 1994-present . Although both Aylwin and Frei were
elected directly by the voters, some scholars argue that
Chile has not consolidated its democracy, due in large
measure to the continuing influence and prerogatives of the
Chilean military.
1 New York Times (New York), 11 March 199i
The first part of the thesis reviews the events leading
to the overthrow of the socialist President Salvador
Allende. The main factor in the demise of the socialist
government was their inability to effectively deal with
coalition politics and rampant inflation. This section also
deals with the coup led by General Pinochet and the reforms
of his seventeen year authoritarian government. The
transition to democracy is examined from the plebiscite in
1988 to the current government and the detention of General
Pinochet in London for human rights violations.
The thesis is a single case study of Chile, viewed
longitudinally from 1988 to 1998. The body of the thesis
compares the military prerogatives in Chile during the
Pinochet regime with those of the military today. Numerous
pieces of legislation were enacted during the Pinochet
regime to ensure the strong position of the military in
dealing with the future elected civilian governments. The
two democratically elected governments have attempted to
reduce the prerogatives of the military through legislation
with limited success.
Finally, this thesis looks at the prospects for
consolidation of democracy in Chile. It reviews the legacy
of the military regime and the politics of coalition
building in the Chilean party system. A key element to
removing the vestiges of the military prerogatives in the
elected government is to build a coalition to garner the
votes necessary for constitutional change.
The issue of civil-military relations in Chile is
important because Chile has the most promising economy in
Latin America and the fostering of democracy provides
stability and security to support United States goals in the
region. The thesis is also important because countries in
the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay) and outside of the region have moved from military
authoritarian rule to democracy. In each of those countries,
the civilian control of the military is an issue that needs
to be addressed in order to fully consolidate democracy.
The Chilean case may have implications for these cases.
B . BACKGROUND
President Salvador Allende in his first address to the
Chilean Congress in 1971 stated, "The Chilean Armed Forces
and the Carabineros, faithful to their duty and to their
tradition of non-intervention in the political process, will
support a social organization which corresponds to the will
of the people as expressed in terms of the established
Constitution." 2 The address by Salvador Allende was an
9
' Regis Debray, The Chilean Revolution : Conversations with Allende,
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 172.
eerie foreshadowing of the changes that were to come to
Chile during his presidency. The armed forces, led by
General Augusto Pinochet, whom Salvador Allende trusted,
would dismantle the long established democracy in Chile.
The Salvador Allende government had promised the
destruction of large landholdings (latifundios) and of
monopolies, a reform of the tax system, and the
nationalization of banking and credit, as well as of
foreign-owned industries and mines. 3 The Allende regime
would seek to end the ^dependency' of Chile, as a nation on
the periphery, on the United States. The major industries,
such as copper were partly-owned or majority-owned by U.S.
conglomerates. Chile possesses the largest copper reserves
in the world, and copper is the most important natural
resource to the Chilean economy.
The initial economic strategy of the Allende government
was the nationalization of the copper industry and other
major businesses. The Allende government, within weeks of
taking office, was able to garner a unanimously-approved
constitutional amendment to nationalize the copper mines. 4
3 Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile,
1964-1976, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 130.
4 Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 23.
In addition, Allende froze prices and raised wages in an
effort to boost the standard of living of the working class.
During this period, the price of copper on the world market
went down and the government was unable to meet its growing
expenses. The economic policies resulted in a staggering
inflation rate. 5 A major factor in the financial troubles
for the government were the deficits accumulating from the
businesses that had been nationalized. Between August 1972
and August 1973 the annual inflation rate was 647 percent. 6
In defining the budget deficits that the Socialist
regime was implementing In the budget, Paul Sigmund suggests
these deficits seemed more Keynesian than Marxist, as the
Socialists deemed it necessary to stimulate the economy and
to employ unused capacity. 7 The nationalization of many
industries drew the ire of multinational businesses in the
United States beyond the copper interests. The
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) corporation had
considerable trouble with their subsidiary in Chile.
5 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 137
6 Genaro Arriagada, Pinochet The Politics of Power, trans. Nancy Morris
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 7.
' Sigmund, 137.
The Nixon administration also stepped up a campaign of
providing money for opposition parties. David Rockefeller,
Chase Manhattan Bank Board Chairman, along with other
multinational corporations, offered to set up a fund, with
the money to be distributed by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to the opponents of Salvador Allende. 8 A visit
by Fidel Castro to Chile was met with mixed emotions in
Chile, as well as Washington.
An invisible blockade by the United States and the
runaway inflation were major problems in the second year of
Allende' s term. The invisible economic blockade consisted
of the United States denying loans by American banks and
limiting the sale of certain sensitive goods to Chile. This
tactic was designed to weaken the stability of the Allende
government. 9 Social unrest began to grow and the popular
support for the regime began to wane as the economic debacle
plagued all segments of society.
Looking for assistance on the international front,
President Allende addressed the United Nations in late 1972
and complained of the multinational corporations in general
8 Mark Falcoff, Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History, (New
Jersey: • Transaction Publishers, 1989), 205.
9 Alan Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, trans. Paul
Sigmund (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 241.
and Kennecott (a U.S. Copper company) and ITT in
particular. 10 Allende blamed the corporations for
exploiting the Chilean people, to increase their own
profits. After New York, Allende traveled to Moscow to seek
support for his troubled regime. The Soviet Union embraced
the Chilean president but was not quick to extend support to
the troubled regime.
President Allende returned to his troubled land without
the help that he had hoped for from the international
community. A further indication of increasing polarization
came with the elections of the newly elected Congress.
Eduardo Frei, the former President of Chile, was elected
president of the Senate and a strongly partisan Christian
Democrat was also chosen to preside over the Chamber. 11 The
coalition politics of the Chilean party system were again
beginning to shift. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
pledged to oppose the agenda of socialist reform.
Traditional party competition did not allow the votes




12 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 347.
President Allende had trouble with stability in his own
cabinet. In less than three years he had revamped his
cabinet numerous times. His various ministers did not have
the ability to control the myriad of problems associated
with the nationalization of industry. The technical
expertise was not in place to take on such a massive
undertaking. Inflation continued to swirl and the labor
force was growing unsteady. The proliferation of nation-
wide strikes crippled the country. Chile is heavily
dependent on the transportation of goods by truck, based on
physical geography. Strikes by truck drivers and other
labor unions were devastating to the weakening economy. 13
The military was also growing uneasy with the malaise of the
Allende government.
On September 11, 1973 General Augusto Pinochet led an
overthrow of the government that irrevocably changed the
nature of civil-military relations in Chile. During the
overthrow, President Salvador Allende committed suicide and
a seventeen year authoritarian regime began. The overthrow
of Allende' s government had 2 basic aims: (1) to destroy
the parties of the left and their collaborators; and (2) to
13 Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S . -Latin American
Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 175.
engineer a fundamental restructuring of Chilean political
institutions and political life. 14
The first aim was achieved through a repressive regime
that dissolved Congress, abolished the party system, and
prohibited public meetings. 15 The second aim was only
partially achieved. The political institutions that were
present at the beginning of the regime were resurrected
before the 1988 plebiscite. A downturn in the economy
sparked protests in 1982 which led to a resurgence of
political party activism. The political parties that
emerged from the social movement in 1982 were similar to
those that had existed before the military regime. 16
The authoritarian regime of General Pinochet was able
to consolidate political power due to four factors:
1. Pinochet and his junta were able to draw on the
framework of the traditional constitutional legality to
justify one-man rule.
14 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy," in Politics in Developing Countries Comparing
Experiences with Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour
M. Lipset, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 99.
1 ~l Cesar N. Caviedes, Elections in Chile: The Road toward
Redemocratization (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 27.
16 Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic, ed., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile,
1982-1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 11.
2. The junta could rely on the disciplined and
hierarchical nature of the armed forces and the growing
power of the secret police (DINA)
.
3. The junta enjoyed the strong and uncritical support
of much of the business community and sectors of the middle
class
.
4. The junta was able to take advantage of continued
sharp divisions in the opposition. 17
After the coup, a four man military junta was put in
place with General Augusto Pinochet in charge. The other
members of the ruling junta were General Gustavo Leigh of
the Air Force, Admiral Jose Merino of the Navy, and General
Cesar Mendoza of the Carabineros (national police). 18
General Pinochet put the Congress in recess indefinitely and
broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. The United States
suspended military aid to Chile in 1974 based on human
rights violations. Senator Edward Kennedy was influential
in passing a bill that restricted military sales and
technology to the military regime in 1976. 19
17 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy", 99.
1° Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime
in Chile, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 83.
19 Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic, ed., The Struggle for Democracy in Chile,
1982-1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 259.
10
The role of the United States, in the coup, came to
light during United States Congressional hearings.
Intelligence sources from the United States had covertly
aided the opposition with monetary payments. Then Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger, had played down the role of U.S.
involvement in Chilean politics and the coup in testimony to
the United States House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign
Relations committees. 20
General Pinochet was able to consolidate his power and
began a series of policy changes. The most important piece
of legislation was Decree Law 527 on June 26, 1974 which
directly took the constitutional framework of the 1925
constitution and applied it to the military government
.
21
By adopting the constitution of 1925, the Pinochet regime
attempted to legitimize their authoritarian government. The
decree granted General Pinochet full executive powers, which
gave him the dominant role in the junta. General Pinochet
was able to issue decrees that the other members of the
junta could not veto. 22 For the Chilean elites and business
20 Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1985), 9.
o -I
Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy", 100.
9 j>" Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies : Chile
Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 66.
11
community, no matter how objectionable the Pinochet
government was because of its radical free-market policies,
it remained a far preferable alternative to the democratic
government of Allende, because of the uncertainties of the
democratic policies. 23
The Pinochet government worked out a number deals with
U.S. companies, to include Kennecott and ITT, that had had
their assets seized as part of the socialist nationalization
initiatives. In 1974, Decree Law 600 allowed for financial
incentives for foreign investment in Chile. 24 The decree
received a favorable reaction from many multinational
corporations. A negative aspect was the repression of human
rights and abuses of those thought to be disloyal to the new
ruling junta.
The reports of human rights violations grew and
strained Chilean international relations, particularly with
the United States. The United Nations General Assembly
issued four letters of condemnation to Chile. To pacify the
international community, General Pinochet held a referendum
23 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy", 104.
24 Heraldo Munoz, "External Relations Under the Military Government," in
Military Rule in Chile, ed. Julio Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 307.
12
in 1978 to show his popular support. Voters were required
to vote yes or no to the following proposition:
In light of the international aggression unloosed
against the government of our patria, I support
President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity
of Chile, and I reaffirm the legitimacy of the
government of the Republic to lead sovereignly
the process of institutionalization of the country. 25
The referendum was approved by the Chilean voters, but the
vote was questioned by outside observers for the wording of
the ballot and that opponents were fearful to vote against
General Pinochet for fear of retribution.
Seven years after the overthrow of President Allende,
General Pinochet wanted to afford greater legitimacy to his
regime. He did this by holding a plebiscite in 1980, to
approve a constitution to replace the one of 1925. 26 This
carefully crafted constitution was the institutional
centerpiece of the regime's effort to reshape Chilean
politics. The constitution gained acceptance in the tightly
controlled plebiscite. 27 The plebiscite also granted
25 Paul Zagorski, Democracy vs. National Security Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1992), 41.
2 ° Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz, Chile The Great Transformation
(Harrisonburg, Virginia: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 16.
27 Timothy R. Scully, "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile," in
Building Democratic Institutions Party Systems in Latin America, ed.
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1995), 122.
13
Pinochet eight more years in power in what he called a
protected democracy. Officially the period of time was
called a transition period to democracy and strengthened
Pinochet's personal power. 28 Throughout his dictatorship
Pinochet continued to consolidate power not in the office he
held, but in himself.
General Pinochet allowed for another plebiscite in 1988
to allow his regime to remain in power for another eight
years. This time the vote did not go in his favor, so he was
forced to hold a general election. The burgeoning of the
political party system allowed the revitalized parties to
work on a campaign to get out the vote to defeat the
military regime. The campaign was successful and a majority
(57 percent) voted no to the military regime. Two elements
made it possible for the no plebiscite: (1) elements in the
military and in the civilian political right expected a fair
contest and would not have tolerated any disruption of the
process; and (2) opposition leaders were successful in
persuading voters to stay home, waiting calmly for results
2° Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Political Processes in an Authoritarian
Regime," in Military Rule in Chile, ed. Julio Valenzuela and Arturo
Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 173.
14
on election night, and to celebrate peacefully the next
day. 29
Opponents of General Pinochet stressed calm by the
populace for fear that any large outpouring of emotion might
cause General Pinochet to discount the plebiscite because of
social unrest. The results of the vote were reported with
little disturbance and presidential elections were
scheduled. General Pinochet had established the rules of
the game with a plebiscite he thought he would win.
However, Pinochet received only forty-three percent of the
votes and became a victim of his own game. Patricio Aylwin,
of the Concertacion Party, was elected to the presidency in
198 9 and Pinochet turned over the government to Aylwin in
1990.
General Pinochet enacted legislation before turning
over power to ensure a continuing role of the military in
Chilean politics. The core of Pinochet's efforts lay in the
establishment of a strong political right and a military
that commanded ample power. Through the 1980 constitution
and the 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces, Pinochet hoped
29 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy", 108.
15
to bind the hands of civilian successors. 30 When the
democratic regime came to power in 1990, it confronted a
Constitutional Court with seven members, all appointed by
Pinochet, not one of whom was removable until he reached
retirement age of seventy-five . 31
While the enacted legislation was a constraint on the
democratically elected government, it will be shown that the
military has lost some of the strength of its prerogatives
in the last ten years. President Aylwin (1990-1994) and
President Eduardo Frei (1994-present) have attempted to
diminish the military prerogatives in Chile with various
legislative initiatives.
C . IMPORTANCE
The topic is important because Chile has the most
promising economy in Latin America and the fostering of
democracy provides stability and security to support United
States goals in the region. If the military prerogatives
in Chile continue, democracy will not be fully consolidated.
The implications for other countries in the region such as
Peru and Paraguay, with lingering high military
30 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 456.
31 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation Southern Europe, South America , and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 209.
16
prerogatives, is that Chilean civil-military relations could
have a demonstration effect in civil-military relations in
those countries. Following the military coup in Chile,
seven of the eleven independent South American countries
were under military governments (Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, joined by Argentina in 1976). 32
The wave of democracy in South America is still in its early
stages and needs to be supported.
It is in the interest of the United States to foster
consolidation of democracy in Chile. Since the return to
democracy is relatively new, the United States can influence
the direction of the civilian government, with initiatives
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) . In
Santiago, Chile, at the Summit of the Americas in April
1998, President Clinton expressed the economic goal for the
United States to create a Western Hemispheric free trade
zone by 2005. 33 President Clinton wants to include Chile as
part of the NAFTA agreement, but he has been slowed by a
reluctance of the U.S. Congress to expand NAFTA. The
globalization of the world economy, by means of
technological advancements, makes it necessary to reduce
32 Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz, Chile the Great Transformation,
(Harrisonburg, Virginia: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 14..
33 Miami Herald (Miami), 12 April 1998.
17
trade barriers to provide greater access to markets, such as
Chile. Free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere are
an integral part of the continued economic development for
Chile and other Latin American nations.
The turbulence in the world economy could cause a
reverse wave of democracy if the economic troubles persist.
Democracy could be threatened, according to Samuel
Huntington, if an economic crisis or collapse that
intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of
remedies that could only be imposed by authoritarian
governments. 34 It is important for the United States to
utilize its status as a world leader to cultivate democratic
political systems.
D. THEORY - DEMOCRACY AND CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY DEFINED
Through the course of history, numerous concepts have
been applied to define democracy. A common definition is
the procedural criteria specified by Robert Dahl . The
conditions are summarized (criteria 1-7, below) and further
expanded (criteria 8-9) by Philippe Schmitter and Terry
Karl:
1. Control over government decisions about policy is
34 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 290.
constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and
fairly conducted elections in which coercion is
comparatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the
election of officials.
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for
elective offices in the government.
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without
the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly
defined.
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative
sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of
information exist and are protected by law.
7. Citizens also have the right to form relatively
independent associations or organizations, including
independent political parties and interest groups.
8. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise
their constitutional powers without being subjected to




9. The polity must be self-governing; it must be able
to act independently of constraints imposed by some
overwatching political system. 35
The variations in democracy are numerous. These nine
principles are a framework that is common to some degree in
all truly democratic systems.
In the Chilean case, it is critical to pay close
attention to the eighth principle, to the extent that the
armed forces in Chile infringe on the power of the elected
officials. This principle was added by Schmitter and Karl
to discount the countries where civilian control over the
military is minimal. It can be argued, using this
principle, that democracy in Chile is constrained by the
military. The elected officials in Chile can exercise their
constitutional powers, but the constitution was written by
the former military authoritarian regime.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan define a consolidated
democracy by three criteria:
1. Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is
consolidated when no significant national, social, economic,
political, or institutional actors spend significant
resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating
35 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...and Is
Not," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc
Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 45.
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a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign
intervention to secede from the state.
2. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated
when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief
that democratic procedures and institutions are the most
appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such
as theirs and when the support for opposing alternatives is
quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic
forces
.
3. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is
consolidated when government and nongovernmental forces
alike, throughout the territory of the state, become
subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict
within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions
sanctioned by the new democratic process. 36
Based on the Linz and Stepan criteria, the Chilean
democracy is not consolidated. The democratically elected
government is impeded in many ways from changing the
constitutional framework provided by the Pinochet
government. The 1980 constitution mandates that nine of the
36 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6.
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forty-seven senators in Congress are designated positions. 37
This provision allowed conservatives to be selected as
senators, with no elections. The over-representation of the
conservative right in the Congress does not allow for the
current government to make the necessary changes to
consolidate democracy. The executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government have all been constrained by
the former authoritarian regime.
The military is not fully subordinate to the civilian
elected officials of the government and the government does
share power in certain areas with the military. The former
military government left a lasting legacy in the current
constitution to ensure their seemingly autonomous stature.
This study will show the areas in which the military has
retained certain prerogatives and their interaction with the
elected officials.
E. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will examine civil-military relations in
Chile during two time frames, 1988 and 1998. It will apply,
to the Chilean case, the eleven prerogatives defined by
Alfred Stepan in his book, Rethinking Military Politics
37 Arturo Valenzuela, "Government and Politics", in Chile: A Country-
Study, ed. Rex Hudson (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1994), 226
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Brazil and the Southern Cone. It will detail the strength
of the military during the dictatorship to the transition to
democracy.
Today Chile is nearing the completion of the second
democratically elected government since the Pinochet regime.
While the current (inaugurated in 1994) government of
President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle has legitimacy because it
was elected, as part of a governing coalition called the
Concertacion, the military maintains significant
prerogatives within Chile. The military prerogatives
provide a starting point for the study of civil-military
relations in Chile.
The eleven military prerogatives defined by Alfred
Stepan are presented in Table 1. It shows the magnitude of
the dominance of the Chilean military prerogatives in 1988.
Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have said that when the last
authoritarian enclave is finally displaced, Chile will on
that same day complete its transition and consolidate
democracy. 38
Civil-military relations in Chile are affected to a
significant degree by the prerogatives of the military.
Each of the prerogatives will be examined using the two
23
points in time (1988 to 1998) to analyze the state of civil-
military relations in Chile. A military prerogative is
defined as high when the military has greater control of an
area than the civilian authority. In an area that is
controlled by civilian authority, the military has a low
military prerogative. A moderate military prerogative is an
area that is influenced by both the military and civilian
authorities
.
3° Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation Southern Europe, South America , and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 212.
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Table 1. Military Prerogatives in Chile, 1988
Prerogative 1988
Constitutionally sanctioned independent High
role of the military in political system
Military Relationship to chief executive High
Coordination of defense sector High
Active-duty military participation in High
Cabinet
Role of Legislature High
Role of senior career civil servants or
civilian political appointees High
Role in intelligence High
Role in police High
Role in military promotions High
Role in state enterprises High
Role in Legal System High
Source: Author, based on Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military
Politics Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988), 94-97.
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II. MILITARY PREROGATIVES IN CHILE
A careful study of that period would conclude
that the military had to act or else the
country would have failed. We have now
completed our mission.
General Pinochet, 11 March 199839
A. CONSTITUTIONALLY SANCTIONED INDEPENDENT ROLE OF THE
MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The following chapter is the heart of the thesis. It
examines eleven prerogatives of the Chilean military in 1988
and 1998. This analysis provides the basis for the
conclusion in chapter three.
During the years of the authoritarian regime of General
Pinochet, the military dominated all areas of the political
system. When military prerogatives are high the
constitution allocates primary responsibility for internal
law and order to the military and implicitly gives the
military great decisional latitude in determining when and
how to carry out their responsibilities. If military
prerogatives are low, military actions in a particular area
are only undertaken when ordered by the appropriate civilian
official, within a framework established by the legal system
and the legislature. 40 The Carabineros (National Police) in
39 New York Times (New York), 11 March 1998.
40 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94.
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Chile were considered a branch of the armed forces, along
with the army, navy, and air force. While the mission of
the Carabineros was to provide internal security, they
shared a similar hierarchical status as the armed forces.
However, the Aylwin government was able to return the
Carabineros to the Interior Ministry after a seventeen year
period under the Ministry of Defense. This transfer made
the internal security the preserve of the police and not the
military. 41 While the Carabineros technically belong to the
Interior Ministry today, they remain a national force unlike
ordinary law enforcement agencies.
The most constraining constitutional formula for a new
democratic government is one where the incoming government
has to agree to rule with an authoritarian constitution
crafted by the outgoing authoritarian regime. 42 General
Pinochet was able to constitutionally sanction many of the
military prerogatives into law with the 1980 constitution
and the 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces. However, the
41 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 458.
42 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 206.
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1980 constitution also established the rules for the
eventual transition to democracy in 1989. 43
Today this military prerogative remains high as the
military still remains an important actor in the political
system. Democracy requires that the armed forces, as well
as other nonelected sectors of the executive branch, be
subordinated to and governed by elected officials. 44 The
ability to amend the constitution is curtailed by the
binomial electoral system in Chile, which makes it extremely
difficult to achieve the necessary votes for amending the
constitution. The binomial electoral system, invented by
the Pinochet regime, artificially inflated the proportion of
contested seats going to the conservative parties. There
are two seats for every district in Chile's legislature.
The most popular party (usually one of the parties belonging
to the Concertacion) would have to earn a vote double that
43 Philip Oxhorn, Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the
Struggle for Democracy in Chile (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995), 97.
44 Paul W. Zagorski, Democracy vs. National Security Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1992), 53.
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of its nearest competitor if it were to win both seats
within a district. 45
The nature of coalition politics in Chile affords
little opportunity for any faction to achieve the majority
of votes to pass amendments to the constitution. For
reforms requiring constitutional change a three-fifths
majority is needed. 46 A sixty percent majority is difficult
in Chile as the political parties are distributed almost
evenly in thirds between the right, center, and left. The
centrist parties have the best opportunity to gain the votes
necessary for constitutional reform. Through bargaining the
parties at the center could form a coalition with the left
or right to gain a majority coalition. 47
In summary, the military's prerogative remains high in
this area. The military has a constitutionally sanctioned
role in the political system which diminishes the control of
the civilian government over the military. The prospect to
lower the military prerogative in this area is minimal,
based on the difficulty of constitutional reform in Chile.
45 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power Institutions and Civil-
Military Relations in Argentina (University Park, Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 200.
46 Ibid., 205.
47 Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 128.
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B. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
In a democratic regime with low military prerogatives
the chief executive (president) is the commander in chief.
If the de facto control of the armed forces is in the hands
of the uniformed active-duty service commanders, the
military prerogatives are high. 48 General Pinochet was the
chief executive and commander in chief throughout his
seventeen year reign. The overthrow of the democratically
elected Salvador Allende is a stark reminder of the former
frail nature of the chief executive. General Pinochet
recently stated, "I wish things could have been different.
I wish Allende had left of his own accord with the
guarantees of safety I offered to him. In the end he chose
not take this course. Instead he chose suicide." 49 General
Pinochet's dominance was rarely challenged, because of the
strength of the military government and his former actions.
On March 11, 1990 when Patricio Aylwin became
president, he was the chief executive and General Pinochet
remained as commander in chief of the army. Twelve days
before President Aylwin was sworn in, the Organic Law of the
Armed Forces (Law 18,948 of February 1990) was signed by
4 °Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94.
49 New York Times (New York), 9 November 1998.
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Pinochet and approved by the Constitutional Tribunal
Pinochet had created and appointed in 1980. This law
greatly increased the institutional autonomy of the armed
forces. In the critical area of personnel policy, the law
removed the president's right to order officers into
retirement and made the gatekeeping nominations to major
general (from which all future commanders in chief would be
drawn) the exclusive prerogative of the commander in chief,
of the respective service, reinforcing ambitious army
officers' dependence on Pinochet. 50 This safeguard also
assured the continuation of General Pinochet as commander in
chief of the army until 1998, a position he used to keep a
watchful eye over the new democracy. 51 Both President
Aylwin and President Eduardo Frei had to deal with General
Pinochet, without the ability to remove him.
President Aylwin initiated legislation to reduce the
power of the military, making it more accountable to the
chief executive. The bills introduced were to allow the
president the right to promote and retire military officers,
including the chiefs of each branch of the armed forces.
50 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 208.
51 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 456.
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The measures would also have restructured the National
Security Council to provide greater civilian control on
matters of national security. 52 The legislation did not
pass in Congress, due to right wing conservative support for
the former military government. President Aylwin led an
efficacious government but he was hindered in many respects.
Aylwin had to deal with General Pinochet as commander in
chief of the army, a Senate dominated by the right, and a
pro-military judiciary. 53 President Aylwin proved to be a
capable president and maintained the model of economic
prosperity and growth.
In March 1998 General Pinochet retired from the armed
forces and became a senator for life. President Frei had to
choose from a list of five generals that Pinochet hand
picked to succeed him as commander of the armed forces. The
new commander is General Ricardo Izurieta. As President Frei
was able to choose the successor from Pinochets' list, this
military prerogative is now moderate, as General Pinochet is
no longer the commander in chief of the army.
52 Lois Hect Oppenheim, Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism
and the Search for Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 221.
53 Thomas Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 145.
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The constraints on the executive branch will continue
unless legislation can be passed to amend the laws that
still bar the removability of service chiefs by the
president. In the future, presidents may be able to better
shape the hierarchy of the military as the Pinochet mystique
fades. The next generation of military leaders will not be
as imbedded with the thinking of General Pinochet.
In summary, the military prerogative in relationship to
the chief executive has moved from high to moderate between
1988 and 1998. The chief executive no longer has to deal
with General Pinochet as a service chief, but the president
is still constrained by being unable to remove the service
chiefs from office.
C. COORDINATION OF DEFENSE SECTOR
The defense sector should be coordinated by a Cabinet-
level official, normally appointed by the chief executive.
That official should control a staff with extensive
participation by professional civil servants in a democratic
regime with low military prerogatives. If the military
prerogatives are high, the defense sector is coordinated by
the service chiefs, with very weak supervision and
comprehensive planning by the chief executive. 54 During the
54 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94.
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Pinochet regime the defense sector was coordinated by the
ruling military junta. Each of the service chiefs worked
together and formulated defense policy. All aspects of
national defense from arms production to policy were under
the control of the military regime.
Today the Minister of Defense in Chile is a civilian
political appointee. However, the military prerogative
remains moderate as the service chiefs work directly with
the Minister of Defense. A civilian is not appointed to
oversee each branch of service, which provides a great deal
of autonomy for the military. The chiefs of each branch of
the armed forces are virtually egual partners with the
Minister of Defense, while technically subordinate to
civilian control. The service chiefs maintain a strong
position because President Frei cannot easily dismiss them.
The Frei administration set out to pursue a
nonpartisan, consensus, state-based defense policy. The
Defense Ministry has promoted an active policy to involve
civilians in the defense sector. Their lack of involvement
in the past has hindered good relations between civilians
and the military. 55
55
"Chile: Civil-Military Relations in 1995 Viewed" in La Nacion
[database on-line]; available from FBIS.
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In summary, the military prerogative in the
coordination of the defense sector has moved from high to
moderate between 1988 and 1998. The military and the
civilian appointees now work together in the development of
defense policy. The potential exists for greater control by
the civilian government over the military in this area as
civilians become more involved in the defense sector.
D. ACTIVE -DUTY MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE CABINET
In a democratic system with low military prerogatives
there is generally no active duty military participation in
the cabinet. If the military prerogatives are high,
military officers may participate as ministers in the
cabinet. This is especially true for those with national
security tasks, such as the National Security Council. 56
During the Pinochet regime the cabinet consisted primarily
of the ruling military junta. Nearly fifty percent of
cabinet officials between 1973 and 1987 were military
officers. Active-duty officers also served as
subsecretaries, university rectors, diplomats,
administrators of state corporations, regional intendants,
mayors, governors, and members of the junta's four
56 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 95.
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legislative commissions. 57 The cabinet was merely a small
group of generals who maintained the power of the military
government
.
As for military prerogatives, the Pinochet charter
called for a military-dominated National Security Council
(NSC) with veto power over a wide range of policies after he
allowed the democratic transition to occur in March of
1990. 58 As the NSC was dominated by the military, the
civilian government was unable to exercise effective control
over this powerful organization.
President Frei in October 1995 submitted to Congress a
package of constitutional amendments, including the
restructuring of the National Security Council, to allow for
greater civilian authority, and the granting of greater
oversight power to Congress. 59 The legislation did not
pass, but it was a solid attempt by the government to gain
further control over the military. Once again coalition
politics thwarted the efforts of the chief executive. Many
politicians have become accustomed to seeing the recent
5/ Karen L. Remmer, Military Rule in Latin America (Boston: Unwin Hyman,
1989), 132.
58 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 456.
59 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 458.
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attempts at constitutional reform being blocked by the
legislative branch. 60 Some right wing senators blocked the
government efforts to change the constitution. 61 President
Frei continues in the struggle of trying to diminish the
military role in the political system.
In summary, the military prerogative of participation
in the cabinet has remained high from 1988 to 1998. The
constitution grants the military strong participation in the
cabinet. The outlook is for a continued high military
prerogative in this area, in accordance with current law.
E. ROLE OF LEGISLATURE
In a legislature with low military prerogatives, most
major policy issues affecting military budgets, force
structure, and new weapons initiatives are monitored by the
legislature. Cabinet level officials and chief aides
routinely appear before legislative committees to defend and
explain policy initiatives and to present legislation. If
the military prerogatives are high, the legislature simply
approves or disapproves the executive's budget. There is no
60 Alicia Frohman, "Chile: External Actors and the Transition to
Democracy," in Beyond Sovereignty Collectively Defending Democracy in
the Americas, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), 246.
61 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 459.
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As part of his larger effort to ensure military
autonomy from civilian politicians, Pinochet took measures
to guarantee the armed forces ample fiscal resources. The
1989 Organic law of the Armed Forces stipulates that the
defense budget may not fall below the absolute minimum
amount of 1989. The armed forces are also entitled to 10
percent of all profits of the state owned copper company,
CODELCO, with an annual minimum of U.S. $180 million. 63 The
civilian government has limited control to diminish the
budget of the military.
The military is guaranteed its minimum budget by law.
In the past few years, the share of the federal budget spent
on the military has lowered, due to a strong economy. As a
share of the federal budget, the Chilean military received
11.34 percent in 1989. By 1995 the share of the federal
budget that was spent on the military was 8.65 percent. 64
In Chile, copper is the most important natural resource and
62 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 95.
63 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 459.
64 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 459.
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the copper industry provides vast revenues for the federal
government. The ability of the military to share in the
profits of the copper industry illustrates the high
prerogatives of the military in the legislative budget.
The military also gained another voice in the
legislature with General Pinochet' s new title of Senator for
life. Senator Jorge Lavanderos, a Christian Democrat in the
Chilean Senate, said, "This is the only country in the world
where a dictator will be allowed to sit among a
democratically elected Congress." 65 As a member of the
Chilean Senate, Pinochet will be able to keep an eye on the
continuing struggle of the civilian government to gain
greater control over the military.
The legislative branch is restrained by the competition
of party politics. In the success of the two presidential
elections, in 1990 and 1994, which were won by the
Concertacion party, virtually all major political decisions
were arranged by coalition building. 66 To amend the
constitution and reduce the military budget will require a
difficult compromise across party lines.
65 New York Times (New York), 11 March 1998.
66 Philip Oxhorn, Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the
Struggle for Democracy in Chile (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995), 264.
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In summary, the military prerogative in the role of the
legislature has remained high from 1988 to 1998. The
legislature controls the federal budget but is prohibited
from lowering the military allocation beyond levels set by
the Pinochet regime.
F. ROLE OF SENIOR CAREER CIVIL SERVANTS OR CIVILIAN
POLITICAL APPOINTEES
A professional cadre of highly informed civil servants
play a major role in assisting executive branch in designing
and implementing defense and national security policy in a
democracy with low military prerogatives. If the military
prerogatives are high, active duty military officials fill
almost all top defense sector roles. Civilian participants




The Pinochet regime designed and implemented all facets
of defense and national security policy during its tenure.
General Pinochet personally appointed all of the officials
to senior level positions in the government. Between 1973
and 1986, of the 118 individuals who served as the head of a
" Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 95.
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government agency, 52 were military officers. 68 The Organic
Law of the Armed Forces in 1989 was designed by Pinochet to
assure the continued influence of the military in the
decision making process. The heavy influence of the military
in the National Security Council and other defense policy
making offices has not allowed the civil servants to have
effective control.
The retirement of General Pinochet from the military in
1998 may allow the senior civil servants a more productive
role in defense policy. CI audio Holzman, of the University
of Chile's Institute of Political Science and the Freedom of
Development Institute, explains that the retirement of
Pinochet changes the High Command, signifying as- a result, a
qualitative modification in organization. This is
independent of the fact that the objectives remain the same
as to what the Army means as an institution. 69
Today the senior civil servants and the military share
more of a dual responsibility in defining and implementing
national security policy. The military influence is still
strong but has diminished in the last decade.
6 ° Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile
Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 84.
69
"Chile: Impact of Pinochet Retirement Viewed" in El Mercurio, 23 Sep
1996 [database on-line]; available from FBIS.
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In summary, the military prerogatives in this area were
high in 1988, but are moderate today. There has been a
steady decline in the role of military officers assuming
senior positions in the government. The civilian role may
grow larger with the retirement of General Pinochet.
G. ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
In a country with high military prerogatives
intelligence agencies are controlled by active-duty, general
level officers who combine intelligence gathering and
operations functions, with no independent civilian review
boards. If the military prerogatives are low, intelligence
agencies are controlled by civilian chains of command, with
strong civilian review boards. 70 During the Pinochet
regime, General Manuel Contreras was in charge of the secret
police known as the DINA (National Intelligence
Directorate) . All intelligence activity was given to DINA,
a
#
military organization with a technical-professional
character that took its orders directly from the military
junta. 71 The DINA had almost limitless power and answered
only to General Pinochet.
'° Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 96.
71 Genaro A. Herrera, "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the
Armed Forces in Chile," in Military Rule in Chile, ed. J. Samuel
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The DINA was disbanded due to the number of human
rights abuses reportedly committed by the organization. It
was replaced by the Central Office of Information (CNI) . On
paper, the CNI appeared to be a standard intelligence agency
but in fact it followed DINA in almost all methods, such as
reporting directly to General Pinochet. 72 General Contreras
went to jail only in late October 1995, after the government
conceded a pay hike and proposed legislation to put closure
on some 600 odd remaining court cases. 73 For many years
after the Pinochet regime, few human rights cases came to
trial because Pinochet had granted amnesty to the officers
of his authoritarian regime.
The intelligence community today no longer has the
power it did during the Pinochet regime. The alleged abuse
of human rights without punishment is still a negative
lingering effect on the intelligence community. Based on
past history, the role in intelligence of the military is
more closely watched by the civilian government. During the
Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 131.
72 Manuel A. Garreton, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military
Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule Latin America, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 105.
73 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 459.
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authoritarian rule the role of intelligence was to enforce,
by any means, the edicts of General Pinochet. Today
intelligence agencies are controlled by a democratically
elected government.
In summary, the military prerogatives in the role of
intelligence was high in 1988, but are moderate in 1998.
The revelation of human rights abuses in Chile, to the world
community, has allowed the elected government greater
control of intelligence agencies.
H. ROLE IN POLICE
The police in a democratic regime should be under the
control of a nonmilitary ministry and no active-duty
military officers should be allowed to command a police
unit. If the military prerogatives are high, the police
operate under overall direct command of the military and
most local police chiefs are active duty military. 74
General Pinochet treated the Carabineros (National Police)
as a branch of the military government. The commander of
the Carabineros was one of the four members of the military
junta that initially seized power in 1973. The Carabineros
were under the direct control of the military. As a result
74 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 96.
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the Carabineros enjoyed the same high prerogatives as the
military during the transition to democracy.
As part of the constitutional reform during the
Pinochet regime the commander of the Carabineros is also a
member of the National Security Council (NSC) . The
Carabinero commander also has the same privilege as the
other chiefs of the branches of the armed forces in that he
cannot be removed from office by the president. This
stipulation allows for a good deal of autonomy for the
police from the executive branch of government.
The efforts of President Aylwin allowed the
Carabineros to be put under the operational control of the
Interior Ministry. The Carabineros are still the national
police today and remain a strong voice at the national
level. The direction of the military in its role of the
police has been lifted and the focus of the military is
toward external security.
President Frei was unsuccessful in his attempt to
remove General Rodolfo Stange, Commander of the Carabineros,
in 1995. General Stange was under investigation for
allegedly concealing a murder in 1985. President Frei asked
General Stange to resign from his post. General Stange
refused to resign, using his constitutional privilege of not
46
being removed from command by the chief executive. 75 The
focus of the Carabineros is on internal security of the
state but they still have moderate prerogatives with the
high stature in government and substantial autonomy.
In summary, the military prerogative in the area of the
police was high in 1988, but is moderate in 1998. The
Carabineros are now under the control of the Interior
Ministry, as opposed to Minister of Defense in 1988. The
prerogative remains moderate as the chief executive is
unable to remove the commander in chief of the Carabineros
from office.
I. ROLE IN MILITARY PROMOTIONS
A military with high prerogatives is able to play a
major role in setting the boundaries for promotion patterns.
The executive branch would be very tightly constrained in
determining who could be chosen from promotion lists
forwarded by each service. If the military prerogatives are
low, the legislature discusses and approves the promotion
law. A professional military promotion board makes
recommendations to cabinet level officials, who in turn make
recommendations to the executive. The executive is not
7 R Joaquin Fermandois and Michael Morris, Democracy in Chile:
Transition and Consolidation 1987-2000. (London: Research Institute
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995), 16.
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typically constrained in the selection of major policy
making posts. 76
The fact that President Frei had to choose from a list
of names composed by General Pinochet, to choose the new
armed forces commander, is a vivid reminder of the high
military prerogative in military promotions. The military
has great autonomy in the promotion system. The Organic Law
of the Armed Forces details many of the facets that guide
the careers of Chilean military officers. The laws
governing the armed forces were written by the armed forces,
a sure sign of the military's influence from 1973 to 1990.
General Pinochet had full control over military
promotions during his regime. Those who served the regime
rose quickly in the ranks. Officers who voiced opposition
were forced into retirement. This is due in part to the
personalistic nature of the Pinochet regime. A week prior to
his military retirement on 10 March 1998, all 45 army
generals appointed General Pinochet as "a meritorious
commander in chief for life." Frei administration officials
have said the declaration was just an honorary title, but
critics said it was a message of unconditional support for
76 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 96.
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the general even in his retirement. 77 The underlying
meaning of the honorary title is a public allegiance of the
entire command structure of the Chilean army to the man who
shaped their careers.
The armed forces also tried to protect itself from
civilian control by passing the Organic Law of the Armed
Forces, by which General Pinochet granted himself virtual
control over the army and, according to some, powers
parallel to those of the president and minister of
defense. 78 Only one officer, General Pinochet himself, was
exempt from normal retirement regulations. All other active
duty generals rose from the ranks during Pinochet' s tenure




Based on Chilean law the executive branch is still
constrained on military promotions. In a small way,
President Frei has been able to shape the future of the
Chilean military by choosing from a list the successor of
Pinochet to lead the armed forces. While the military
77 JVew York Times (New York), 11 March 1998.
'° Lois Oppenheim, Politics in Chile Democracy, Authoritarianism, and




retains virtual autonomy in the promotion system, the
prospects for increased civilian oversight is now possible
with the retirement of General Pinochet from the military.
In summary, the military prerogative in the military
promotion system has remained high from 1988 to 1998. The
chief executive is constrained by the commander in chief of
each service, in that he cannot remove them and must choose
a successor for each chief from a list composed by the
commanders
.
J. ROLE IN STATE ENTERPRISES
State enterprises would only exceptionally be headed by
an active-duty military officer in a democratic regime with
low military prerogatives. If the military prerogatives are
high, occasionally by law and normally by tradition, active




In Chile, the military regime tried to move away from
the socialist government of Salvador Allende. The
nationalization of industry was the goal of the socialist
Allende government. Instead, the Pinochet regime pushed for
free market economics and the general dismantling of state
80 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 97.
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intervention in a competitive market. 81 At the time of the
overthrow in 1972 the state owned 251 firms and had
intervened in 259. When General Pinochet turned over the
government to the Aylwin administration in 1990, the state
owned 41 firms and one bank, including the copper company
(CODELCO). 82 Allowing market forces to guide the economy,
rather than the state, has led to a prosperous economy. The
Pinochet regime instituted three components to the economy:
1. A drastic reduction in the role of the state.
2. An opening of the economy to international trade
and financial flows.
3. Free market policies governing price determination
and capital markets. 83
General Pinochet opened the way for a free market
economy during his regime. The success of the economy was
based on allowing many industries to revert to private
control and allowing market forces to shape industry. These
progressive policies were not the economic genius of General
81 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies : Chile
Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 11.
82 Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz, Chile the Great Transformation,
(Harrisonburg, Virginia: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 50.
83 Philip Oxhorn, Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the
Struggle for Democracy in Chile (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995), 68.
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Pinochet but of an economic team trained in the United
States. These men studied business at the University of
Chicago, under the tutelage of Milton Friedman, and became
known as the Chicago Boys. 84 In state enterprises the
military had high prerogatives but chose not to exercise
them as the military knew it did not have the expertise in
the economic arena. This allowed Chile to capitalize on its
principal competitive advantage of the country' s vast
quantities of natural resources, for which there is a high
level of international demand. 85
Chile enjoys a free market economy today and has one of
the strongest economies in Latin America. The military
still does receive ten percent of the copper profits by law
and the copper industry is still owned by the state. The
only industry controlled by the military is defense
manufacturing. During the Pinochet regime, defense
84 Manuel A. Garreton, "The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military
Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule Latin America, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 100.
85 Javier Martinez and Alvaro Diaz, Chile the Great Transformation,
(Harrisonburg, Virginia: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 50.
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production was limited to the maintenance and overhaul of
systems purchased on the international market. 85
There are three military-run companies that provide
service and support for the armed forces. The Chilean army
manufacturer (FAMAE) , aircraft manufacturer (ENAER) , and the
naval manufacturer (ASMAR) . Interestingly, in an economy
led by the private sector, control of defense manufacturers
remains in the hands of the military - albeit one that
respects market forces. 87 The Chilean military defense
sector has been profitable because, unlike other countries
in the region, they have focused on small scale production
to accomplish their mission of supporting foreign bought
hardware
.
In summary, the military prerogative in state
enterprises has moved from high to moderate between 1988 and
1998. The free market economy has allowed most enterprises
to be run by corporate professionals, with the exception of
defense manufacturing.
85 Patrice Franko, "Defense Production in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: A
Comparative Perspective," Defense Analysis 12, no. 3 (1996): 322.
87 Patrice Franko, "Defense Production in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: A
Comparative Perspective," Defense Analysis 12, no. 3 (1996): 323.
53
K. ROLE IN LEGAL SYSTEM
Civilians and military personnel are subject to civil
laws and civil courts in a democracy with low military
prerogatives. The military would have almost no legal
jurisdiction outside of narrowly defined internal offenses
against military discipline. If the military prerogatives
are high, national security laws and the military court
system would cover large areas of political and civil
society. The domain where military members could be tried
in civil courts would be very narrow. 88
General Pinochet was able to manipulate the legal
system by granting amnesty to the officers of his regime for
the alleged crimes committed during the initial years of
military control. Decree Law 2191 was put into effect on
19 April 1978. 89 The decree granted amnesty to all
politically connected crimes involving the military since
the overthrow of the Allende government. The goal of the
measure was to instill national reconciliation. As results
in Chile and elsewhere suggest, prosecuting officers for
human rights violations is arguably where civilian
88 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics Brazil and the Southern
Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 97.
89 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile
Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 129.
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politicians have met with the least success. 90 Both the
Aylwin and Frei governments have attempted, with little
success, to bring to justice those officers responsible for
crimes committed during the military regime.
The first official action taken by the government into
human rights violations was in 1991 during the Aylwin
administration. An eight member Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation was headed by Raul Rettig, a centrist Radical
lawyer and former senator. The commission included not only
human rights activists and sympathizers but respected
conservative jurists and educators as well, two of whom had
been members of the Pinochet government in the 1970s. 91 The
Rettig Commission report was strong on words but did little
to bring to justice those responsible for the atrocities.
The judiciary and especially the Supreme Court (almost all
members are still Pinochet appointees) are a serious
impediment to investigations regarding human rights
abuses. 92 In response to the Rettig Commission report the
90 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 460.
91 Sigmund, 190.
92 Alicia Frohman, "Chile: External Actors and the Transition to
Democracy," in Beyond Sovereignty Collectively Defending Democracy in
the Americas, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996), 246.
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Supreme Court ruled in August 1990 that Decree Law 2191, the
amnesty law, was constitutional. 93
During the final months of his regime, General Pinochet
was able to appoint nine new judges (of the sixteen total)
to the Supreme Court for life terms. He was able to do this
by offering generous retirement benefits to the older
judges, which opened positions on the court for his
appointees. 94 The full accounting of the past acts may
never come to light, but the door has not been fully closed.
General Pinochet was highly critical of the Rettig
Commission. He believed it was an attempt to demean the
military. In an interview, General Pinochet stated, "Proof
of it was the date established by the Rettig Commission to
start its investigative work. That is, it was not necessary
to investigate violent actions prior to 1973. It was not
necessary to investigate the training and equipping of
paramilitary Marxist forces which promoted an armed
93 David Pion-Berlin, Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and
Civil Military Relations in Argentina (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University, 1997), 202.
94 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile
Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 318.
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revolution and which had to be combated by the Armed
Forces." 95
On 30 May 1995, the Supreme Court convicted retired
General Manuel Contreras, former chief of Chile's secret
police, and second in command, General Pedro Espinosa, for
ordering the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, foreign
minister under the Allende government. This was a
significant achievement. 96 It took almost twenty years
after the assassination to achieve a conviction, but the
former officers were brought to justice. General Contreras
was not able to use the military amnesty for the
assassination of Letelier in his defense because the amnesty
only applied to actions in Chile. Orlando Letelier was
assassinated in Washington.
The military still retains moderate prerogatives in the
legal system. The judicial system has been strained by the
amnesty given to the military and Carabineros during the
authoritarian regime.
The detention of General Pinochet in London, since 16
October 1998, at the request of Spain, is a sign that the
95
"Pinochet Reviews 1995, Looks Ahead" in La Tercera De La Hora, 31 Dec
1995 [database on-line]; available from FBIS.
96 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 461.
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international community is not as complacent about the
violations of human rights that occurred during Pinochet's
regime. The Spanish government is requesting the
extradition of General Pinochet to Spain because of the
deaths of Spanish citizens in Chile during his dictatorship.
The government of Spain is also seeking justice for the
Chilean citizens who also died. 97
A lawyer for General Pinochet claimed that his arrest
and detention in London threatened to destroy the delicate
balance between the interests of justice and state stability
and that Chile had made its peace with its former
dictator. 98 The delicate balance of state stability may
come under increasing judicial review. Other members of the
military are worried that Baltasar Garzon, the Spanish judge
handling Pinochet's case, may ask for their extradition in
connection with human rights abuses. A list of secret
police (DINA) was reportedly given to Garzon, prompting some
Chilean Army officers to express concern that the Army might
be tried as a whole. 99 The outcome of the General Pinochet
97 New York Times (New York), 9 November 1998.
98 New York Times (New York), 10 November 1998.
' Global Intelligence Update, "Possible Security Forces Meeting a
Threat to Chilean Stability," [database on-line] (23 Nov 1998) available
from http://www.stratfor.com; Internet.
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extradition to Spain may signal a significant change for the
Chilean military in the legal system. It is possible that
the recent events might renew the call for justice against
the atrocities committed by the military during the military
regime. However, President Frei would have to amend the
constitution in order to repeal the amnesty law. To repeal
the law would require a two-thirds majority vote in both
houses of Congress, which is difficult to obtain in a
legislature with a strong right wing. 100 The amnesty law
that now protects the military from the past could be
repealed in the future.
In summary, the military prerogative in the legal
system has moved from high in 1988 to moderate in 1998. The
amnesty law in effect is an impediment to the judicial
process, but the incarceration of General Contreras and the
arrest of General Pinochet show the long term resolve of the
Chilean people.
100 Joaquin Fermandois and Michael Morris, Democracy in Chile:
Transition and Consolidation 1987-2000 (London: Research Institute for




Don't forget that in the history of the
world, there was a plebiscite, in which
Christ and Barabbas were being judged, and
the people chose Barabbas
.
General Pinochet, October 25, 1988 101
Military prerogatives remain moderate to high in Chile
but each democratically elected government has been able to
lower the influence of the military in the political system.
While some vestiges of the Pinochet regime remain in the
government, there is evidence of greater civilian control
over the military.
Table 2 shows the changing character of the Chilean
military prerogatives from 1988 to 1998. The military no
longer has as many high prerogatives as it had during the
authoritarian regime of Pinochet. However, the Chilean
military still retains many prerogatives that prevent the
full consolidation of democracy.
During the authoritarian regime, the military had high
prerogatives in all eleven areas evaluated. Today, the
military has high prerogatives in only four areas. In seven
of the eleven areas the military now has moderate
prerogatives. In these seven areas, the civilian government
and the armed forces both have influence. Since the
101 La Epoca (Santiago), 26 October 198i
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transition to democracy in 1990 the elected officials have
made progress.
Table 2. Military Prerogatives in Chile, 1988 and 1998
Prerogative 1988 1998
Constitutionally sanctioned
independent role of the
military in political system
Military Relationship to chief
executive




Role of senior career civil




Role in military promotions
Role in state enterprises












Source: Author, based on Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military
Politics Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988), 94-97.
The high prerogatives of the military in the areas that
are sanctioned by the constitution are of greatest concern.
These prerogatives include the clause of nonremovability of
service chiefs by the chief executive and the lack of
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civilian control over the military budget. These two areas
are troublesome because the difficult process of
constitutional change is required to lower the military
prerogative. This leads to the conclusion that while Chile
has made progress in the last ten years, considerable
legislative work will be required to fully consolidate
democracy.
General Pinochet's retirement from the military in
March of 1998 marked a significant development. For more
than twenty-five years Pinochet remained the commander of
the armed forces. At his elaborate retirement ceremony,
General Pinochet stated, "It was obvious that Chile was
headed for self-destruction, so the armed forces- took over
to defend our country's integrity. A careful study of that
period would conclude that the military had to act or else
the country would have failed. We have now completed our
mission." 102 As a senator for life, Pinochet remains a
political force but the end of an era came to pass with his
military retirement.
Political analysts view Pinochet's departure from the
military as a necessary step toward consolidating democracy
102 New York Times (New York), 11 March 1998.
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in Chile. 103 However, the retirement of General Pinochet is
not the end of the military influence in Chilean politics.
Pinochet's arrest in London has caused concern in Chile
about the stability of democracy. "This is the most
delicate moment we have experienced in the democratic
transition, " said Andre Zaldivar, president of the Senate
and a Christian Democratic candidate for president. "I'm
not afraid of a coup or an interruption of democracy, but I
see the possibility of the country entering into a period of




The Chilean people are sharply divided on the issue of
Pinochet's detention in London. President Eduardo Frei,
concerned about the discord since General Pinochet's arrest,
said the arrest "shows that our reconciliation is incomplete
and we must work hard to strengthen that process in the
future." 105 General Pinochet has been accused by the
Spanish government for the deaths and disappearance of more
than three thousand people.
103 New York Times (New York), 11 March 1998.
104 JVew York Times (New York), 24 October 1998.
105 New York Times (New York) , 22 November 1998
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Chile's ambassador to London, Mario Artaza, said, "We
are not here to protect our dictator of yesterday, we are
here to protect and defend our transition to democracy." 106
The Chilean government contends that General Pinochet was
traveling on a diplomatic passport and as a former head of
state he is immune from prosecution. The current fate of
General Pinochet is in the hands of the British, but his
legacy continues in Chile.
In many Latin American nations, officers still perceive
themselves as serving "el estado" (the state) or "la patria"
(the country) rather than the government or the population.
If the government fails in its mission to serve "el estado 7',
then the military has the obligation to judge and correct
the situation. These attitudes were formed in the
nineteenth century and are likely to survive for some
time. 107 General Pinochet fostered these notions within the
framework of his right to overthrow the government. Only
time and diligence by the duly elected civilians will help
to overcome these attitudes.
106 New York Times (New York), 27 November 1998.
107 Richard L. Millett, "The Future of Latin America's Armed Forces" in
Beyond' Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition, ed.
Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold Bliss (Miami: North-South Center
Press, 1996), 295.
65
So far, governance under the new democracy has
militated in favor of a gradual yet irreversible reduction
of military power. Low inflation, economic prosperity,
diminishing poverty, social stability, and repeated
demonstrations of electoral support for mainstream
politicians have marked Chile's new democracy. 108 However,
three legacies remain from the troubled times before and
after the coup: (1) the legacy of fear; (2) the legacy of
domestic politics; and (3) the legacy of international
relations. 109
The turbulent 1970s remain ingrained in the minds of
the Chilean people. From the chaos of the Allende
government to the human rights abuses of the Pin'ochet
regime, an air of apprehension lingers from the past.
Segments of Chilean society felt threatened by the socialist
government and supported the Pinochet regime. 110 The legacy
of the constitution crafted by the military, who also
108 Wendy Hunter, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and
Peru," Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1997): 462.
109 Lois Hect Oppenheim, Politics in Chile: Democracy,
Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1993), 208.
110 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition
and Consolidation , (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996), 224.
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granted themselves immunity for their misdeeds, still is the
framework by which domestic politics are guided.
Future presidents of Chile also need to remember the
nature of coalition politics after being elected to the
presidency. The president must constantly work on forming
coalitions to pass legislation. If not, the government will
be embroiled in party competition and will undermine the
ruling party's appeal. 111
With time and continued strong civilian leadership,
democracy may well become fully consolidated in Chile.
Despite seventeen years of repression under Pinochet's
authoritarian rule, and the significant changes in social,
political, and economic life, the party system that
reappeared in the 1980s displayed fundamental continuities
with the one that preceded it. 112 The future of democracy
and the Chilean party system as an institution are
encouraging.
In the words of Arturo Valenzuela, "In overcoming the
wrenching crisis of the recent past by turning to their
country's historical democratic traditions, Chileans have
set the foundation for a promising future as a democratic
m Cesar N. Caviedes, Elections in Chile: The Road toward
Redemocratization (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 5
112 Mainwaring and Scully, 18.
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nation." 113 In the future, the grip of the military will
have less of an influence on the democracy as General
Pinochet fades from the political scene.
In the years to come, the potential exists for
constitutional reform that will diminish the influence of
the military. This could be done by reform of the binomial
electoral system. It will require the building of a
coalition to mandate the needed changes to the constitution
That is, when the last authoritarian enclave is finally
displaced, Chile will on that same day complete its
transition and fully consolidate democracy. 114 The
consolidation of democracy will herald a time of lower
military prerogatives in Chile.
113 Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin
American Democracy", 112.
114 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition
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